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Abstract: Welfare biology is the study of the welfare of living things. Welfare is net 
happiness (enjoyment minus suffering). Since this necessarily involves feelings, Dawkins 
(2014) has suggested that animal welfare science may face a paradox, because feelings are 
very difficult to study. The following paper provides an explanation for how welfare biology 
could help to reduce this paradox by answering some difficult questions regarding animal 
welfare. Simple means based on commonsense could reduce animal suffering enormously at 
low or even negative costs to humans. Ways to increase the influence of animal welfare 
advocates are also discussed, focusing initially on farmed animals and restrictions that are 
not likely to impede scientific advances on which the future large improvements in animal 
welfare greatly depend. 
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It is encouraging to see very significant increases in interest in animal welfare in recent 
years and decades, including the large growth of scientific publications on animal welfare 
science (e.g., Walker et al., 2014). We should have had more compassion earlier and should 
have done more for animal welfare. However, better late than never. With the current 
increase in interest, if it is sustained, much more could be done. This paper attempts to 
show how welfare biology (which I helped to develop two decades ago; see Ng, 1995) could 
help. The hope is to make recommendations that will help resolve some difficult problems 
surrounding animal welfare (Carpendale, 2013/2016). There are some simple, 
commonsense methods that can help reduce animal suffering enormously at little cost — or 
even a net gain — to humans. Finally, how animal welfare advocates could increase their 
influence will be discussed. 
 
Welfare Biology vs. the World Knot 
 
Schopenhauer’s (1906/2014) “world knot” refers to the philosophical problem of 
explaining consciousness: How could the material brain give rise to feeling? How could 
matter give rise to mind? This world knot is so difficult to unravel that it has lately been 
dubbed “the hard problem” (Chalmers, 1995). The philosopher Daniel Dennett’s (1991) 
book is called Consciousness Explained, but having read the book from cover to cover and 
understood virtually everything in it, I still have not seen consciousness explained by even 
0.01%. In a very informative book (very highly recommended) reporting on many 
important recent findings in the neurosciences, Ramachandran (2012, p. 247) states that 
“Sometime in the twenty-first century, science will confront one of its last great mysteries: 
the nature of the self.” I take this to mean the solution of the world knot. Ramachandran is 
apparently encouraged by important new findings to which he personally also contributed. 
Nevertheless, I do not believe the world knot will be unraveled even in the thirty-first 
century. 
The difficulty of solving the hard problem is related to the difficulty of whether 
others, including animals, feel, that is, whether they are conscious (the “other-minds 
problem”). It is this empirical difficulty — together with an excessive concern about being 
accused of naïve anthropomorphism (especially by biologists), along with the century-long 
domination of Watson-Skinnerian behaviorism in psychology (though it had been waning in 
the last few decades) — that has made scientific research on the problem of animal welfare 
(and even just the recognition of the problem) so late in coming. The Cambridge Declaration 
on Animal Consciousness was adopted as late as July 7, 2012. As summarized in Wikipedia on 
Animal Welfare Science, “Although animal welfare has been of great concern for many 
thousands of years in religion and culture, the investigation of animal welfare using 
rigorous scientific methods is a relatively recent development. The world's first Professor of 
Animal Welfare Science, Donald Broom, was appointed by Cambridge University (UK) in 
1986.” The increasing interest in the last decade or so is hence much to be welcomed.  
Although it is difficult to establish with certainty that any individual animal or 
species is capable of feeling and hence that their welfare is a matter of concern, this 
difficulty must not be over-emphasized. Strictly, this lack of 100% certainty applies also to 
members of our own species; the only exception is oneself, the subject of the only feelings 




anyone can ever feel: One may have 100% certainty that one feels what one feels while one 
is feeling it. This we already know from the outcome of Descartes’s meditations on doubt 
and certainty: the Cogito. But in this philosophical sense of 100% certainty, one is not even 
sure of the existence of the subjective feelings of one’s spouse! Hence surely 99.99999999% 
is close enough to be taken as if 100% at the practical level. None of us worries about the 
0.00…1% possibility that our spouses or close friends do not really feel either. Practically 
the same goes for the feelings, and hence the welfare needs, of all mammals, if not all 
vertebrates, as established in the recent field of affective neuroscience (e.g., Mashour & 
Alkire, 2013). If we go beyond virtual certainty (99.9% +) to the level of almost certainty 
(95% +), the range of animal species capable of feeling must be greatly widened, as even 
crayfish appear to be capable of anxiety (Fossat, 2014). (For informative and interesting 
accounts of the many impressive capabilities for feelings, including even moral feelings, of 
many animal species far beyond what we would have imagined, see e.g., Balcombe, 2010, 
and Bekoff, 2013.) 
Dawkins (2014, p. 2) argues that “a seeming paradox at the heart of a science of 
animal welfare” is created by the world knot: “To be comprehensive enough to include what 
most people mean by animal welfare, it must involve understanding what animals 
consciously feel and experience. But to be a science, it has to embrace the one thing that 
biology currently finds very difficult, if not impossible to study, namely, animal 
consciousness.” Dawkins discusses four ways out of this paradox: (1) denying the paradox 
by regarding animal consciousness as not a problem for scientific study; (2) doing the next 
best thing, by studying behavioral and physiological correlates of consciousness instead of 
studying consciousness directly; (3) believing that the paradox will disappear with more 
research; (4) regarding the resolution of the paradox as not central to a scientific study of 
animal welfare. As an eclectic, I believe that all four approaches contain some valid 
elements, but they are not enough to resolve the paradox fully. Instead of discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of these four approaches in detail, I explain below how 
welfare biology (Ng, 1995) may help to resolve the paradox, or at least reduce its impact, 
and to provide useful guides on many issues of animal welfare. 
In my welfare biology paper of 1995, I defined welfare biology as the study of living 
things with respect to their welfare, defined as net happiness (enjoyment minus suffering) 
and used evolutionary biology, population dynamics and economics to help answer three 
basic questions in welfare biology: (1) The individual members of which species are capable 
of suffering/enjoyment? (2) Are their welfare levels positive or negative? (3) How could 
their welfare be increased? These three questions of which, whether, and how somewhat 
parallel the three basic questions of economics: What, how, and for whom are the various 
goods and services produced? My basic training as an economist no doubt influenced my 
choice of the three basic welfare biological questions. 
Owing to the difficulty of the world knot, the first question is very difficult to answer 
directly. However, using compelling axioms based on the principles of evolutionary biology, 
I show that a species must be flexible for its members to be capable of feeling. Roughly 
speaking, brain mechanisms giving rise to feelings must consume energy. If these feelings 
do not affect the flexible behavioral choices of the species, they do not contribute to their 
survival and reproductive fitness, and hence they cannot survive evolutionary competition. 
In evolutionary equilibrium, traits that are not adaptive are not retained. Thus, the 
behaviors of feeling species must be flexible, that is, not completely hard-wired genetically. 




This constraint transforms the first question about consciousness (which is very difficult to 
answer) into one about flexible behavior (still difficult but less so). If we can establish that 
the behavior of a species is completely inflexible, its members are unlikely capable of feeling. 
In contrast, species capable of flexible choices are likely to be capable of 
suffering/enjoyment. 
This result obviously has important implications for the study of animal welfare. 
However, it has not been widely noticed during two decades since its publication. As I am 
not a biologist by training, I could develop the result only in its general terms. Further 
specific developments and applications call for more specific knowledge beyond my 
expertise. I hope that some biologists and those interested in animal welfare will be able to 
build further progress on my contributions. 
Apart from the result about behavioral flexibility and feeling, my 1995 paper has 
several other implications that may be relevant for animal welfare. Generalizing the Lotka-
Volterra model of population dynamics, I showed that welfare can be increased without 
reducing the number of individual animals. This result was applied by Clarke and Ng (2006). 
 
Simple and Low-Cost Ways to Reduce Animal Suffering 
 
There are simple ways to reduce animal suffering substantially at a very low or zero cost — 
or even a net gain — to humans. The following examples are just illustrative. 
 First, some simple regulations on the farming of animals can drastically reduce 
animal suffering. For example, in the factory farming of chickens, simple regulations on the 
minimum cage size can significantly improve chicken welfare. The inadequacy of current 
regulations and the inaction toward improving them are largely due to mistaken ideas. Most 
producers believe that stricter regulations will increase their costs and reduce their profits. 
However, since industries like factory chicken farming are highly competitive, they cannot 
generate long-run supernormal profits; they can only earn average rates of return. Thus, 
after a temporary period of adjustment, stricter regulations will only increase the prices of 
the final products without affecting the profitability of the producers. True, consumers will 
then have to pay higher prices. However, despite temporary setbacks due to the recent 
financial crisis, the longer-term trend is for more and more consumers to be willing to pay 
higher prices for products that involve less cruelty to animals (e.g., Grimsrud et al., 2013; 
Lagerkvist & Hess, 2011; Miranda-de la Lama et al., 2013; Napolitano, 2010).  
 Moreover, at least for the developed economies, meat consumption is unhealthily 
excessive. Thus, the higher prices for meat, by inducing consumers to buy less meat, 
actually make them better off. The costs for humans of improving animal welfare may well 
be negative! This is not just wishful thinking, but it is supported by research. As shown by 
Gruber and Mullainathan (2005), taxes on cigarettes that increase their prices actually 
make smokers healthier and happier. An important role for animal welfare advocates would 
hence be to educate the public about this, showing how it would be to society’s advantage to 
adopt stricter regulations on reducing animal suffering. 
 Second, the prohibition of cruelty to animals that serves no purpose at all should be 
extended. Just two examples are given here. First, as reported by Bekoff (2013, pp. 230-231) 
on the study of David Evans and Paul McGreevy (2011), “whipping horses [in horse racing] 
is pointless and does not make a difference in the outcome of the race … increased whip use 
was not associated with significant variation in velocity.” I would go further. Even if 




whipping were effective in increasing the speed, it should still be completely banned. 
Suppose whipping increased speed by x%. After banning, the speed of all horses would 
decrease by about x%. Since this applies to all horses in the race, it would not affect the 
competitive outcome. Problems such as unfairness would arise only if some horses were 
allowed to be whipped and some not. As banning should apply to all, no real problems are 
created, but we save much suffering for the horses. 
 As another example, fish mongers in the wet markets in Hong Kong (probably in 
other places as well) use the practice of cutting eels into two halves alive, leaving them 
wriggling in pain to attract customers and to show that their fish are very fresh. I have 
argued with them more than once that this would inflict pain. No one challenged me on this. 
However, one replied to me, “If I cannot sell the fish, I will also suffer pain!” Even assuming 
that the fish mongers are right in thinking that the practice helps them sell fish, it should 
still be banned. The pain of being cut into half and writhing in pain until death is too terrible 
to be tolerated. Moreover, forbidding a fish monger to do this only hurts him if others are 
allowed to continue to do it. If all fish mongers are prevented by law and enforcement from 
engaging in this cruel practice, they can still sell fish at the same rates.  
 As in the horse whipping example above, this is just another case of relative 
competition between individual producers or consumers that leads to inefficient social 
outcomes and a lot of needless suffering. Society needs to adopt legislative and law-
enforcement measures to ban such inefficient competition that really serves no good 
purpose and causes so much gratuitous suffering. This should be distinguished from 
competition between producers in reducing costs or increasing the quality of products in a 
way that does increase efficiency. This efficient competition (that does not involve cruelty 
and other external costs like pollution) should be allowed if not encouraged. The problem is 
not competition as such but external costs to other sentients.  
 Third, we should put less emphasis on GDP (gross domestic product) and its growth 
and more on the environment and true welfare for both humans and other animals. 
Research in recent decades has shown that, above a relatively low threshold level, further 
increases in an individual’s consumption do not really increase happiness significantly (as 
surveyed in Diener et al., 2010; Ng, 2015). This is even truer at the social level. Each 
individual may still find higher income and consumption important because of relative 
comparisons. However, at the social level, an increase in the relative standing of one implies 
decreases for others. On average, the relative income of the whole society cannot change. In 
addition, the production and consumption of most goods and services involve significant 
environmental disruption. Thus, even just from the human welfare point of view, we have 
excessive production and consumption. Income and consumption taxes, instead of being 
distortive (by distorting choices and hence imposing burdens on producers and consumers 
by an amount larger than the taxes collected) as most economists believe, are actually 
corrective (Ng, 2003). Moreover, economic growth may be (human) welfare-decreasing, 
even while ignoring the big destruction of the habitats of nonhuman animals. If we take 
account of animal welfare, even just weighting their relative importance at only 1%, the 
desirability of environmentally unfriendly growth becomes very doubtful. When I proposed 
the environmentally responsible happy nation index (Ng, 2008) to supplement if not 
replace GDP, I took mainly human welfare into consideration. The additional consideration 
of animal welfare further strengthens the case for greater conservation and against 
environmental disruption. 




 Environmental and animal welfare protection may be costly in reducing GDP 
produced. However, at least for most advanced economies, as higher consumption no 
longer increases happiness, the costs may only be large in monetary terms but trivial or 
even negative in true welfare terms. Money does not buy happiness, but since happiness 
also includes ultimate values, it may be that environmental and animal welfare protection is 
not really costly at all! 
 
Increasing the Influence of Animal Welfare Advocates 
 
This final section discusses some considerations that could be relevant to increasing the 
influence of animal welfare advocates. 
 First, we should be cautious not to exaggerate our claims in the hope of making them 
more convincing. For example, I find Bekoff’s (2013) book very readable and informative, 
but I also find some of his conclusions somewhat hyperbolic. For example, the piece on “The 
Birds and the Bees and Their Brains: Size Doesn’t Matter” presents evidence “that we need 
to be very careful making claims that invertebrates do not have emotional lives or feelings” 
(p. 153) because even small insect with tiny brains may be capable of much more feelings 
than we expect. So far this is fine. However, the conclusion that the size (of brains) doesn’t 
matter is unwarranted. The evidence presented does not show that size does not matter, 
only that it is not the only thing that matters and that small size does not entail absence of 
feeling. The piece refers to Jerison’s (1973) encephalization quotient: the positive 
proportionate excess of brain weight over 2/3 of the body weight. The parameter of 2/3 of 
the body weight is used because body surface area increases quadratically with 
proportionate increase in width, height, and length, whereas body weight increases 
cubically. The two-third increase in brain size is thus required simply to coordinate body 
senses and movement.  
 Jerison’s data show clearly that this encephalization quotient shows a very clear 
positive correlation with intelligence. It cannot be concluded that size does not matter. It is 
true that intelligence is not feelings and that one does not have to be very intelligent to have 
strong feelings. It is also true that the matter of moral concern “is not a capacity to think, but 
a capacity to feel” (Balcombe, 2010, p. 44). However, the two are related (e.g., Keltner & 
Horberg, 2015) and there is some correlation between a brain’s size and complexity and its 
capability for both intelligence and feelings. The relevant brain structures and functions 
would seem to be the nociceptive ones, not just brute size, although brain size clearly 
matters as well. A brain of only a few neurons seems unlikely to be capable of either high 
intelligence or strong feelings.  
 Another example (quite common among biologists) of excessive claims is “All life has 
value and should be respected” (Bekoff, 2013, p. 309). In my view, it is not life as such that 
has value, but feeling (i.e., pleasures and pains in a wide sense, including spiritual and 
sensuous) that are of value (to the feeler). Values are felt values. If plants have no feelings, 
then, as non-feelers, they have no felt values of their own — though their lives may have 
high instrumental values for sustaining the lives of feeling animals.  
 Second, there are strategies that animal welfare advocates can use to increase their 
influence on behalf of feeling organisms without having to resort to hyperbole. One way is 
to focus efforts initially on measures that can increase animal welfare or reduce animal 




suffering enormously at small or even negative costs to humans, as discussed in the 
previous section, rather than on measures that are much more costly and likely to engender 
much more resistance. That way, acceptance and progress can be achieved more effectively. 
 Third, and related to the previous point, one consideration is the distinction between 
wild animals and farmed animals. Being much more numerous, wild animals are much more 
important in general and in the long term. However, as a near-term strategy, I suggest that, 
without ignoring wild animals altogether, our initial emphasis should be more on farmed 
animals, for a number of reasons. We are in more direct contact and directly responsible for 
their suffering. Hence, we are likely to gain converts more easily on this front. Also, for wild 
animals, we have less knowledge of them and have less influence over them (except for our 
encroachment on their traditional living habitats). Hence, our attempts to help them today 
may be less effective and less certain. Also, changes in the situation in the wild may have 
more long-term ecological repercussions. Hence, it may be wise to leave most measures on 
their behalf to the to the future, when we know more, after much more scientific progress, 
and after much greater concern for farmed animals has become the norm, legally and 
culturally. 
 Fourth, and related to the previous two points, we must recognize that we will be 
able to help animals more if and when our levels of scientific knowledge and technological 
and economic capabilities are much higher. Thus, while we should definitely do everything 
possible to reduce animal suffering where it is clearly unnecessary for either human or 
animal welfare, we should be careful in pressing for the curtailment of animal research that 
can increase our scientific knowledge in the interests of human or animal welfare. Impeding 
scientific advances could prove harmful not only to ourselves, but also to animals in the 
long run.  
 I view scientists using animals in their research as our potential collaborators rather 
than our enemies. We should of course persuade them to use the least painful means of 
experimentation possible. We should discourage and work to ban painful or stressful 
animal experimentation that serves no important purpose (e.g., to improve cosmetics, used 
for competition in attractiveness between individuals, which is mutually canceling at the 
social level, as discussed above). While we still desperately need advances in bioscience, 
human and veterinary medicine and technology, it makes far more sense for the initial focus 
of animal welfare advocates to be on reducing the enormous gratuitous suffering in factory 
farming. Even on this more limited scope of reducing suffering for farmed animals, we have 
so many things to work hard on. 
 In closing, my view on making an initial distinction between wild and farmed animal 
welfare, and on giving initial priority to reducing harm to animals when it is virtually 
costless and does not impede scientific advances, is just a starting position. Palpable 
progress with these relatively easier welfare problems will then serve as a foundation for 
extending our future efforts in eliminating all needless non-human and human animal 
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